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ABSTRACT
Using a panel of the UK counties, spanning the period 2010-2016, this study explores
whether having a Labour or Conservative council affects a county’s economic freedom.
Due to data unavailability of any economic freedom index for the UK counties,
the analysis employed direct measures in relevance to three sub-components of
economic freedom, i.e. size of government, sound money and the freedom to trade
internationally. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we find strong evidence
that the political ideology of a council affects all three sub-components of economic
freedom. An implication of this result is that councils appeal to specific groups of
voters when making policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Does the political ideology of an administration authority (either on a national
or regional level) affect the economic freedom enjoyed by this country or region?
To answer this question, we must first define economic freedom. Gwartney et al.
(1996) states that “individuals have economic freedom, when (a) property they acquire
without the use of force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical invasions by others and
(b) they are free to use, exchange, or give away their property as long as their actions do not
violate the identical rights of others.” Based on this definition of economic freedom,
Gwartney et al. (1996) develop the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index
for 100 countries, spanning the period 1975–1995. Since then, the index has been
extended by the Fraiser Institute to cover more countries and years.
Given that the definition of economic freedom places a higher weight on
limited government, a potential answer to the opening question of this paper is:
yes, local administrators who favor smaller government should support policies
that lead to a higher level of economic freedom. In the UK, politicians belonging
to the Conservative Party (the Tories) are typically associated with a preference
for a smaller government compared to those associated to the Labour Party. In
the spirit of Downs (1957), the median voter theorem would suggest that ideology
gives way to pragmatism and that administrators seeking to maximize the
likelihood of election and re-election differ only slightly in policies and, as such,
there should be insignificant differences in what is observed when comparing
administrators from different parties, as it relates to the measure of economic
freedom. Alternatively, county-level political competition might be viewed as a
struggle between two different constituencies within the same region/county. In
this environment, voters elect gubernatorial candidates who hold specific policy
ideas that might impact economic freedom in different ways. A large body of
research has examined whether the parties will converge towards the middle
leading to very little difference if they are vote maximizers. A limited selection of
this research includes Winters (1976), Garand (1988), Krehbiel (1993), Blais et al.
(1993), Imbeau et al. (2001), Besley and Case (2003), Pettersoson-Lidbom (2003),
and Lee et al. (2004).
Researchers who have perhaps made the most use of economic freedom data
are those studying economic growth. Compton et al. (2011) find that higher rates of
economic growth are positively associated with economic freedom. Related work
has focused on the relationship between economic freedom and income inequality
with mixed results (Berggren, 1999; Scully, 2002; Carter, 2007; Compton et al.,
2014). In addition, research has been done on migration and economic freedom,
the black/white income gap and economic freedom, and entrepreneurship and
economic freedom2. More germane to our study, Bjornskov and Potrafke (2013)
hypothesize that the ideology of economic freedom is favored by Republican
voters. The authors examine whether policy in the areas of the size of government
and labour market regulation is higher when Republicans are in control of the
elected branches of a state’s government. They also find that Republican governors
are more active in deregulating labour markets. In addition, Reed (2006) finds that
Democratic control of the state legislature leads to higher tax burdens. However,
2
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Reed finds that the political party of the governor has little effect on taxes. This
latter result supports earlier findings by Besley and Case (1995). Thus, the influence
of administrators’ political affiliation on economic freedom remains unsettled.
One of the more well-known works by Caplan (2001) presents a model where
the government becomes a ‘leviathan’ in that it grows faster and further than
the desires of its citizenry. In this model, a government wants to expand its own
power since this power then becomes self-reinforcing and leads to even greater
power. One must keep in mind that if one political party is more conservative,
there could be real limits placed on the growth of government when this party is
in power, thus thwarting the ‘leviathan’ growth potential. Moreover, regarding
this idea, Campbell et al. (2007) extend this model to include real growth rates of
government with mixed results. The authors state that “as political parity increases,
the capacity of the minority to block the majority increases thereby encouraging more
interparty logrolling (ibid: p. 579).” These results seem to counter the results by
Bjornskov and Potrafke (2013).
Given the absence of data on the EFW index for the UK counties, the objective
of this paper is to use data on the direct/specific components of the EFW index,
such as government expenses, sound money and freedom to internationally trade,
to test the idea that the political affiliation of the county councils in the UK has
an appreciable impact on those sub-components. The overall economic freedom
measure from this index is comprised of the following three sub-components
for which data can be found across the UK counties. i) size of government, as
government spending (a higher government expenditure is considered as
impinging on economic freedom). ii) sound money is proxied by inflation, since
inflation erodes the value of rightfully earned wages and savings, sound money
is thus essential to protect property rights. When inflation is high, it becomes
difficult for individuals to plan for the future and, thus, to use economic freedom
effectively. iii) freedom to trade internationally, i.e. freedom to exchange is
essential to economic freedom, which is reduced when freedom to exchange does
not include businesses and individuals in other nations.
In reality, there can be certain reasons why a county’s voters would elect a
particular individual as member of the council and these reasons can also have
an influence on the types of policy changes. Thus, the relationship between the
party of the council and the abovementioned dimensions of economic freedom
is potentially endogenous. Therefore, the hypothesis that the traits of economic
freedom, mainly less government intervention in markets, would be more
commonly associated with Conservative than Labour councils, is one that must
be tested with a careful empirical approach. The analysis employs a regression
discontinuity design that leverages the fact that the party of the council is a
deterministic function of the vote margin between the Labour candidate and the
Conservative candidate. This approach allows us to compare counties which are
similarly situated except for their choice of the party of the council. To foreshadow
our results, they provide supportive evidence that Labour councils lead to less
economic freedom. In fact, we find strong evidence that a Labour council leads to
a higher size of government.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the
methodological approach and the dataset employed in this study, while Section
III presents the empirical results and discussions. Finally, Section IV concludes.
II. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. Methodology
A starting point for several previous studies about the relationship between a
council’s partisan ideology and economic freedom is a fixed-effects OLS model:
(1)
where EFWit stands for county i’s component of economic freedom under
examination in year t, Dit is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if county 𝑖’s council
is from the Labour Party, and 0 if the council comes from the Conservative Party.
The coefficient 𝛽 is a consistent estimator of 𝐷, if other potentially confounding
variables, both time-varying and time-invariant, are accounted for in Equation
(1). Time-varying confounders that might be related to both the component of
economic freedom and the party of a county’s council might include the level
of education in a county or the average income in that county. These and other
observable variables are potentially accounted for in the vector 𝑿. Additionally,
the term 𝛼 accounts for both observable and unobservable county fixed-effects,
which could potentially influence the party of the county’s council, 𝛿 accounts for
year-specific factors, which influence economic freedom that could be correlated
with the party of a council, and finally ε denotes the error term. However, even
after accounting for observable confounding variables, this fixed-effects model is
still unable to account for time-varying unobservable factors that could influence
a county’s level of economic freedom and the party of its council. For example,
if an unobserved shock leads to a lower size of government and also increases
the likelihood that a council from the Labour Party would be elected, then the
estimated effect of a council from the Labour Party on this particular component
of economic freedom would also be underestimated. Thus, we cannot rely on
Equation (1) to provide a causal estimate of a council from the Labour Party’s
influence on the particular sub-component of economic freedom.
In order to overcome the endogeneity issue for unobservable shocks, we
follow Lee et al. (2004) and Lee (2008) and employ a regression discontinuity
approach. This approach relies on the fact that the party of the council in power is
a deterministic function of the vote margin. That is:
(2)
where vit is the difference between the vote share of the first and second place
candidates and vit>0, if Dit = 1 and vit < 0, if Dit = 0. We assume that unobservable
variables that are not absorbed by the county fixed-effects vary with vote margin.
In other words, once we condition on vote margin, 𝛽 can be estimated without
bias, which can be expressed formally with:
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(3)
where 𝑓(vit) is a flexible function of the vote margin. A final assumption that
must be made is that (vit) is continuous. Requiring that the vote share function is
continuous from both directions as it approaches the zero-vote margin position,
allows us to approximate the level of economic freedom on either side of the
Labour vote margin. We must make this approximation, because even the closest
votes over our sample period have margins of hundreds of votes. We rely on both
a linear and cubic control function in our estimation of Equation (3).
The use of the regression discontinuity method thus allows us to compare
the components of economic freedom of councils from the Labour Party who
just barely won their election with councils from the Conservative Party who just
barely won theirs. This is an important point, because the estimation of Equation
(3) does not allow us to comment on the level of economic freedom in a county,
where the council of either party won by a relatively large margin. Councils can
win elections, because of past policies, because of past economic performance, or
because of loyalty to the particular political party, amongst other reasons. These
reasons can have implications for the types of policies the council will enact that
contribute to a county’s level of economic freedom. Moreover, these reasons can
affect not only who wins the race for council, but by how much (that is, the win
margin).
The validity of the regression discontinuity approach hinges on the
requirement that once we control for vote margin and other observable timevarying confounding variables, a county’s economic freedom score does not
change as we cross the threshold from a Conservative council to a Labour council,
except for the impact of the council’s ideology. In order to assess this validity,
we follow a recommendation by Lee and Lemieux (2010) and regress each of the
potentially confounding variables on the Labour council variable. If these variables
are continuous across the 50%-50% cutoff, then the coefficient on Labour council
should be close to zero.
B. Data
The starting point for this project is the UK county-level annual data, spanning
the period 2010-2016 period. These years are chosen based on data availability
and primarily on the fact that counties experienced significant reforms prior to
2010. In particular, the UK local (county) governments are elected bodies that
operate in territorially bounded geographical areas, employ professional career
staff, and generally receive over two-thirds of their income from the UK central
government. They are multi-purpose authorities delivering services in the areas
of education, social care, land-use planning, waste management, public housing,
leisure and culture, and welfare benefits. In the UK, prior to the consolidations
that took place in 2009, there were 386 county governments of five types, 32
London boroughs, 36 metropolitan boroughs, and 46 unitary authorities, mostly
in urban areas, delivering all of the services listed above. In the rural areas, by
comparison, there were 34 county councils administering education and social
services, as well as 238 district councils providing welfare and regulatory services.
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2018
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The data used in this study are drawn from two main sources: the Department for
Communities and Local Government’s Revenue expenditure and socio-economic
deprivation statistics, and the UK National Census Statistics and the annual midterm population estimates published by the Office of National Statistics.
As discussed above, our economic freedom measures are based on data from
explicit data that describe three out of the five components of the EFW index. These
three main components are considered as the dependent variable in our estimates.
More specifically, the size of the government across counties is measured as the
total net service expenditure per capita of each county, supplemented within
analysis of the expenditure on the major local government services within county
areas: education, social care, environmental services (e.g. waste management,
environmental health), transport (e.g., highway maintenance, bus services), leisure
and culture (e.g., libraries, sports centres, museums), administration (i.e., central
support services), land use planning, and, social housing. Data are obtained
from the Office of National Statistics. Next, we obtain from the Office of National
Statistics data on relative county consumer price levels of goods and services in
order to calculate the role of inflation as a part of the sound money component of
economic freedom. Finally, data on imports and exports per county are obtained
from the gov.uk site on Her Majesty’s (HM) Revenues & Customs in order to
estimate the trade openness measure per county3
The primary political variable of interest is the political party of each county’s
council. First of all, the post-2009 consolidation period includes 45 counties, of
which 27 come from England, 4 from Northern Ireland, 9 from Scotland and 5 from
Wales. In addition, in relevance to the English counties, 6 of them are characterized
as metropolitan and the remaining as non-metropolitan areas. Data come from
the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, published by the
HM Government. Moreover, in terms of the political background of those councils
and in relevance to the two major political parties in the UK, i.e. Conservatives
(Tories) and Labour, out of 45 counties, in 36 the majority of seats come from the
Conservative Party and in 9 counties from the Labour Party. These data come from
legislation.gov.uk, as well as from the House of Commons Library.
A number of variables measuring county-level characteristics that could
be related to the party of the council are also used to assess the validity of the
regression discontinuity design. County personal income per capita (which
provides statistics on self-employment, employment, pension and investment
income) is obtained from HM Revenues & Customs. County personal income
is converted into constant 2010 pounds using the annual consumer price index,
available from the Office of National Statistics. The percent of the population living
in a census-designated metropolitan area is also retrieved from various editions
of the Office of National Statistics. Finally, the percent of the population with a
bachelor’s degree is extracted from the gov.uk. Summary statistics are provided
in Table 1.

3

Measured as the percent of the sum of imports and exports to GDP).
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Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics
The table provides summary statistics for seven variables. SD denotes standard deviation, minimum statistics (Min.) and maximum
(Max.) statistics together with their mean are noted.

Variable

Mean

SD

Min.

Max.

Labour Council

0.126

0.501

0.000

0.219

Personal Income (2010 £, thousands)

29.56

6.48

15.29

44.78

Percent with Bachelor's Degree

0.157

0.046

0.068

0.317

Percent in Metro Area

0.257

0.191

0.168

0.273

Inflation (%)

1.27

0.16

1.15

1.38

9,367.5

1.079

9,35

9,385

0.65

1.02

0.54

0.78

Net Service Expenditure Per Capita
Trade Openness (as % of GDP)

The table provides summary statistics for seven variables. SD denotes standard
deviation, minimum statistics (Min.) and maximum (Max.) statistics together with
their mean are noted.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Baseline Results
Table 2 provides the results from Equation (3) using the entire sample of counties
and a linear vote margin control function. Recall that an important assumption
made in Section II was that observable and unobservable time-varying confounding
variables vary continuously with the vote margin. Given this assumption, the
inclusion of the control variables in the vector 𝑿𝒊𝒕 in Equation (3) is not necessary.
However, as pointed out by Fredricksson et al. (2013), if these control variables are
not endogenous to the council’s party affiliation, their inclusion can potentially
make the estimate of the effect the council’s party more precise.
The findings document that with respect to the component of the government
size (net service expenditure per capita-Column 1) there is statistical (at 1%)
evidence that a Labour council can implement policies that lead to higher size of
government. Moreover, the size of the estimated coefficient indicates that a Labour
council leads to a size of government that is higher by approximately 0.47, which
economically is a substantial effect. In particular, the standard deviation of the size
of government is 1.08, implying the average effect of a Labour council on this subcomponent of economic freedom is 43.4% of the standard deviation. With respect
to the other two sub-components of economic freedom, the results indicate that
a Labour council contributes 35.6% to higher inflation and 35.4% to weaker trade
openness.
The control variables included in this regression specification also display
statistically significant relationships across the three specifications of economic
freedom. In particular, personal income per capita is positively correlated with all
three sub-components of economic freedom, while the higher the percentage of
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2018
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people with a college degree, the higher the government size and trade openness
are, and the lower inflation is. Finally, there is an indirect association between
the percentage of population living in metropolitan counties and the size of
government, and a positive association between this part of the population and
both inflation and trade openness.
Table 2.
The Effect of a Labour Council on Economic Freedom (Linear Version)
The table reports the linear estimates of a Labour council on economic freedom. Figures in brackets denote p-values. Finally, *:
p≤0.10; **: p≤0.05; ***: p≤0.01.

Variables

Labour Council
Personal Income Per Capita(-1)
Percent with College Degree(-1)
Percent of Population in Metro Areas(-1)
Adjusted R2
No. Observations

Net Service
Expenditure
Per Capita

Inflation

Trade
Openness

(1)
0.468***
[0.00]
1.094***
[0.00]
0.318**
[0.03]
-0.084**
[0.05]
0.73
1,128

(2)
0.057***
[0.00]
1.659***
[0.00]
-0.094*
[0.06]
0.127**
[0.04]
0.68
1,128

(3)
-0.361***
[0.00]
2.344***
[0.00]
1.028***
[0.00]
0.562***
[0.00]
0.82
1,128

Table 3 repeats the previous analysis, but this time it employs a non-linear
(cubic) vote margin control function. The new findings provide strong statistical
support to those reported in Table 2.
Table 3.
The Effect of a Labour Council on Economic Freedom (Non-Linear-Cubic Version)
The table reports the non-linear estimates of a Labour council on economic freedom. Figures in brackets denote p-values. Finally,
*: p≤0.10; **: p≤0.05; ***: p≤0.01.

Variables

Labour Council
Personal Income Per Capita(-1)
Percent with College Degree(-1)
Percent of Population in Metro Areas(-1)
Adjusted R2
No. Observations

https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol21/iss2/5
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v21i2

Net Service
Expenditure
Per Capita

Inflation

Trade
Openness

(1)
0.496***
[0.00]
1.138***
[0.00]
0.279**
[0.04]
-0.089**
[0.05]
0.75
1,128

(2)
0.069***
[0.00]
1.594***
[0.00]
-0.073*
[0.08]
0.146**
[0.03]
0.66
1,128

(3)
-0.388***
[0.00]
2.137***
[0.00]
0.874***
[0.00]
0.528***
[0.00]
0.83
1,128
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B. Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design
Even though the evidence shows no causal impact of a council’s party on the
economic freedom witnessed by a county, it is important to show that the regression
discontinuity approach used in this paper is valid. This approach can only be used
if the researcher is confident that time-varying county-level characteristics, which
could potentially be correlated with the party of the council, are not systematically
different under a Labour council that is barely elected compared to a Conservative
council that is also barely elected. If any of these county-level characteristics are
different on either side of the vote margin cut-off, then it would be imprudent to
state that the council’s partisan affiliation is the cause of any differences between
economic freedom.
A common way to test the validity of the regression discontinuity design is
to regress potentially confounding variables on the Labour council variable. This
method, proposed by Lee and Lemiux (2010), examines whether these variables are
discontinuous at the vote margin cut-off. It is important to note that this validity
test can only examine whether the observable variables, are discontinuous at the
vote margin cut-off. We have no way of testing whether unobservable county-level
characteristics are discontinuous at the cut-off. Tables 4 and 5 (the linear and nonlinear versions, respectively) give us confidence that the other variables that are
plausibly related to whether a county has a Labour council are similar as the vote
margin moves from Labour to Conservative.
Table 4.
Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design (Linear Version)
The table presents the results of testing the validity of the regression discontinuity design in its linear version by regressing
potentially confounding variables on the Labour council variable. Figures in brackets denote p-values.

Variables

Democratic Council
Adjusted R2
No. of Observations

Personal
Income Per
Capita

Percent with
College
Degree

Percent of
Population in
Metro Areas

(1)
-0.00048
[0.28]
0.28
1,128

(2)
-0.00036
[0.39]
0.22
1,128

(3)
-0.00018
[0.55]
0.14
1,128

Table 5.
Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design (Non-Linear Version)
The table presents the results of testing the validity of the regression discontinuity design in its non-linear version by regressing
potentially confounding variables on the Labour council variable. Figures in brackets denote p-values.

Variables

Democratic Council
Adjusted R2
No. of Observations

Personal
Income Per
Capita

Percent with
College
Degree

Percent of
Population in
Metro Areas

(1)
-0.00048
[0.28]
0.28
1,128

(2)
-0.00036
[0.39]
0.22
1,128

(3)
-0.00018
[0.55]
0.14
1,128
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IV. CONCLUSION
The definition of economic freedom emphasized the importance of limited
government with respect to the government size, sound money (inflation) and trade
openness sub-components of economic freedom. Previous research for the case of
the US had found evidence that Democratic governors enact higher income taxes
and that Republican governors are associated with less labor market regulation.
However, researchers had also found evidence that the party of the governor had
little effect on important policy outcomes which contribute to economic freedom.
Given this motivating definition and the unsettled nature of the previous
research, we hypothesized that Labour councils in the UK would enact policies
that would lead to lower economic freedom compared to Conservative councils.
The analysis tested this hypothesis using county-level data in the UK, spanning
the period 2000–2016 and employed a regression discontinuity approach in order
to overcome potentially endogenous relationships between the party of the council
and other factors that could affect the choice of council and the types of economic
policies that are implemented.
The results provided strong statistical (and economic) support to the
hypothesis. Over the time period studied, we found strong evidence that a Labour
council led to lower economic freedom compared to a Conservative council. The
conclusion one could draw from these results is that the partisan ideology could
affect economic freedom through certain sub-channels, such as government size,
sound money and the freedom to internationally trade. In other words, partisan
ideology can have substantial effects on a county’s voter.
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